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Since  the  defeat  in  Congress  of  President  Clinton’s  1993  health  care  inis 
tiative,  health  care  has  ceztsed  to  be  a  ‘Yront  burner”  issue  despite  the 
fact  that  most  of  the  problems  related  to  access,  type,  and  quality  of  care 
that  existed  then  have  worsened.  More  of  the  working  poor  and  their 
families  have  no  access  to  care,  and  those  who  do  have  health  benefits 
are  faced  with  increasingly  restrictive  limits  on  the  type  of  services  they 
receive.  These  problems,  in  conjunction  with  cost  constraints,  raise 
questions  about  quality  of  care.  The  breadth  and  complexity  of  the  issue 
point  to  one  possible  reason  why  President  Clinton’s  proposal  failed  to 
pass  Congress,  namely,  that  in  attempting  to  deal  with  all  of  the  prob- 
lems  of  the  U.S.  health  care  system,  the  plan  introduced  as  many  new 
difficulties  as  it  tried  to  resolve.  And  possibly  for  the  same  reason,  health 
care  issues  have  since  been  addressed  on  a  more  piecemeal  basis,  and  pri- 
marily  at  the  state  and  local  rather  than  the  federal  level.  Moreover,  the 
direction  that  health  care  is  currently  taking,  that  is,  toward  managed 
care,  does  not  address  the  problem  of  access  to  care  for  the  40  million 
Americans  who  are  uninsured,  nearly  a  quarter  of  whom  are  children. 
Rising  costs  and  budget  pressures  are  at  the  heart  of  the  problem  of 
access  to  health  care.  As  Senior  Fellow  Walter  M.  Cadette  notes,  hospi- 
tals  have  increasingly  had  to  deal  with  cost  constraints,  putting  their 
care  of  the  uninsured  poor  at  risk.  Outsourcing  and  the  use  of  contin- 
gent  labor  have  resulted  in  a  reduction  in  employment#based  health 
coverage.  If  individuals  who  are  not  working  or  are  not  eligible  for  work- 
based  insurance  try  to  obtain  coverage  on  their  own,  many  (especially 
those  with  a  record  of  illness)  are  not  able  to  afford  the  high  premiums 
resulting  from  aggressive  underwriting  practices.  Medicaid,  thought  by 
many  to  be  the  ultimate  safety  net,  currently  provides  for  only  half  of 
those  under  the  federal  poverty  line  and,  in  this  time  of  preoccupation 
with  federal  budget  balancing,  provides  even  less  health  care  for  the 
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bility  of  a  cut  in  services  (or  a  rise  in  beneficiary  costs)  in  the  Medicare 
program,  previously  thoughr  to  be  a  politically  sacred  cow. 
The  proposal  contained  in  this  brief  for  financing  health  care-eliminat- 
ing  the  current  system  of  employment-based  tax-exempt  health  insur- 
ance  premiums  in  favor  of  the  required  purchase  of  a  package  of  basic 
services  with  sliding  scale  deductibility-addresses  the  problems  of  both 
access  and  cost.  The  proposal  for  retargeting  tax  subsidies  would  be  more 
equitable  than  the  current  system,  would  result  in  a  better  balance 
between  emergency  and  primary  care  services,  would  eliminate  the  disin- 
centives  to  work  associated  with  the  Medicaid  program,  and  would  be 
administratively  more  efficient.  Moreover,  any  remaining  subsidies,  such 
as  to  hospimls,  would  be  explicit  and  no  longer  be  hidden  in  t_he cost  of 
services. 
To  enact  such  a  sweeping  proposal  would  require  political  will  and 
instructional  effort.  Educating  the  public  about  the  plan’s  savings  and  dis- 
tributional  effects  would  be  difficult,  but  essential.  It  would  be  necesszu-y 
to  provide  a  cogent  explanation  of  how  the  current  health  care  system  is 
funded  (for  example,  the  existence  and  workings  of  cross  subsidies  and 
unfunded  subsidies),  how  these  subsidies  will  change  under  the  new  sys- 
tem,  how  the  plan  will  affect  the  Medicare  and  Medicaid  programs,  and 
how  the  change  from  tax4ree  employment-based  insurance  will  work. 
This  brief  provides  a  foundation  for  debate  about  reforming  the  health 
care  system  and  could  serve  as  first  step  in  an  educational  campaign. 
Dimitri  B.  Papadimitriou 
Executiwe  Director 
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Major  change  in  American  health  care  was  inevitable  in  the  1990s  (with 
or  without  the  Clinton  administration’s  ill-fated  plan),  but  few  antici- 
pated  how  sweeping  the  change  was  to  be.  The  spread  of  managed  care 
has  brought  market  discipline,  however  crude  and  imperfect,  into  the 
picture  as  never  before.  And  the  budgetary  discipline  imposed  on 
Medicare  and  Medicaid  in  the  1980s  has  intensified. 
Prospects  for  controlling  health  care  costs  are  more  promising  than  they 
have  been  in  some  time.  Indeed,  the  rise  in  those  costs  has  slowed  dra- 
matically  in  recent  years;  it  could  easily  come  into  line  with  the  rise  in 
economic  activity  at  large  in  the  next  few  years.  However,  prospects  for 
universal  coverage  have  been  set  back.  With  health  care  delivery 
increasingly  shaped  by  market  and  budgetary  discipline,  the  provision  of 
adequate  health  care  for  the  poor-the  lack  of  which  has  for  some  time 
been  the  major  shortcoming  of  the  American  system-seems  to  be  an 
ever  more  distant  goal. 
The  forces  making  for  that  outcome  are  hard  to  mistake.  First,  hospitals 
face  unprecedented  financial  stress  arising  from  the  cost  constraints  pri* 
vate  and  public  payers  have  succeeded  in  enforcing.  Uncompensated 
care  cross  subsidies,  which  have  acted  as  a  safety  net  for  the  uninsured 
poor,  have  been  put  at  risk  as  a  result. 
Second,  the  cross  subsidies  from  the  healthy  to  the  sick  in  the  individual 
and  small-group  insurance  market-another  safety  net-have  all  but  dis- 
appeared.  People  with  a  history  of  illness  and  in  need  of  recourse  to  that 
market  are  at  risk  of  being  screened  out  directly  or  offered  unaffordable 
insurance  made  useless  by  the  fine  print.  Underwriting-the  process  of 
dividing  the  market  into  risk  categories-has  become  so  aggressive  that Prescripion  for  He&  Cure  Poiicy 
it  is  destroying  the  market  for  health  insurance  for  those  not  covered  in 
a  large-gtoup  plan  at  work  or  by  Medicare  or  Medicaid. 
Third,  Medicare  and  Medicaid  face  significant  new  resource  constraints. 
To  be  sure,  these  programs  must  figure  prominently  in  the  broader  fiscal 
retrenchment  if  the  federal  deficit  is  to  be  controlled.  They  account, 
after  all,  for  20  percent  of  the  budget  and  for  an  even  larger  28  percent  of 
its  growth  in  the  past  10  years.  Even  now,  however,  Medicaid  provides 
for  only  half  of  the  population  below  the  federal  poverty  line.  The 
debate  this  past  year  over  Medicaid’s  remaining  a  federal  entitlement  has 
obscured  the  more  important  point  that,  under  either  the  Clinton 
administration’s  plan  or  the  Republican  Congress’s  plan,  Medicaid  will 
finance  even  less  of  the  health  care  for  the  poor  than  it  does  now.1  As 
for  Medicare,  the  coming  imbalance  between  the  workforce  and  the 
beneficiary  population  as  the  post-World  War  II  baby  boom  ages  points 
to  cutbacks  in  real  services  and  to  increases  in  tax  rates.  These  will  be  all 
the  larger  the  longer  they  are  put  off. 
Finally,  employment-based  health  insurance  has  become  much  less  com- 
monplace  than  it  was  only  a  few  years  ago.  By  outsourcing  work  that  had 
been  done  in-house,  large  companies  have  been  able  to  shed  fringe  bene- 
fits,  which  can  run  quite  high  as  a  share  of  total  compensation  for  low- 
wage  workers.  Employers  who  have  continued  to  offer  health  insurance 
as  part  of  a  compensation  package  have  passed  on  more  of  the  cost  to 
employees  directly.  The  temptation  for  employees  to  drop  coverage  and 
become  a  “free  rider”  in  the  event  of  a  major  illness  has  risen  accord- 
ingly,  notably  among  the  poorly  paid,  whose  inflation-adjusted  compen- 
sation  has  slipped  in  absolute  as  well  as  relative  terms.  Strikingly,  only  80 
percent  of  Americans  not  covered  under  Medicare  and  Medicaid  have 
health  insurance,  down  more  than  IO  percentage  points  from  the  early 
1980s.  Health  care,  like  many  other  aspects  of  American  life,  reflects  the 
growing  impoverishment  of  those  at  the  bottom. 
All  of  this  bodes  ill  for  the  health  care  of  the  growing  number  of 
Americans  who  cannot  afford  to  pay  for  their  own  care.  And  it  bodes  iI 
for  the  nation  as  a  whole.  It  promises  to  make  health  care  all  the  more 
rationed  by  price,  all  the  less  a  basic  citizenship  right  as  it  is  in  just  about 
every  other  advanced  country  of  the  world.  At  the  very  least,  Americans 
will  find  it  increasingly  difficult  to  square  such  a  form  of  rationing  with 
their  view  of  themselves  as  a  caring  people. 
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some  workers  who  because  of  preexisting  conditions  would  lose  their 
he&h  insurance  if  they  were  to  change  jobs.  But  it  does  not  address  the 
broader  and  deeper  problem  of  access  to  health  care  for  the  vast  majority 
of  the  40.6  million  uninsured  (Bennefield  1996)  who  are  locked  out  by 
reason  of  income.  If  that  is  to  be  addressed  seriously,  the  nation  must 
rethink  how  health  care  is  financed.  In  particular,  hard  questions  have  to 
be  raised  about  the  reasonableness  of  the  subsidies  coming  through  the 
tax  exclusion  of  employment-based  health  insurance-subsidies  that 
now  cost  federal  and  state  treasuries  more  than  $80  billion  annually. 
Tax  exclusion  of  employment-based  health  insurance  encourages  those 
who  can  take  advantage  of  it  to  make  excessive  claims  on  health  care 
resources.  And  that  is  one  of  the  main  reasons  why  American  medical 
care  has  become  so  costly  and  why,  as  a  result,  so  many  other  Americans 
lack  health  insurance.  The  question  of  who  pays  becomes  all  the  harder 
to  answer  politically  when  the  bill  is  high.  To  the  extent  medical  care  is 
subsidized,  it  ought  to  be  subsidized  on  the  basis  of  real  need.  The  nation 
would  be  far  better  off  if  health  care  policy  (including  Medicare),  just  as 
other  aspects  of  public  life,  were  governed  by  that  principle. 
Retargeting  tax  subsidies  to  fimd  medical  care  for  all  those  in  need  of 
subsidy  will  not  be  easy  to  effect  politically.  The  right  has  been  unwilling 
to  act  like  authentic  conservatives  and  use  the  power  of  government  to 
remedy  problems  the  market  cannot;  the  left  has  been  wedded  to  an 
entitlement  state  that,  in  practice,  has  deprived  government  of  the 
resources  needed  to  deal  with  problems  of  poverty. 
The  need  for  hndamental  reform  of  the  nation’s  health  care  system  will 
not  go  away,  however  (Aaron  1996).  Indeed,  it  will  become  more  press- 
ing  as  the  market  and  budgetary  disciplines  now  taking  hold  bite  even 
harder  on  a  system  that  already  has  lost  much  of  its  institutional  capacity 
to  care  for  the  low-income  sick.  And  it  will  become  more  pressing  as 
employment-based  health  insurance  becomes  even  less  the  norm  in 
changing  labor  markets.  What  is  more,  the  financial  stress  hospitals  face 
will  adversely  affect  the  health  care  of  even  high-income  Americans 
who  can  afford  the  best  care.  Quality  for  all  can  be  expected  to  slip  in  a 
regime  of  forced  economies,  just  as  public  services  have  in  the  high-rent 
districts  of  such  cities  as  Washington,  D.C.,  and  Newark,  New  Jersey. 
Those  neighborhoods  have  not  been  immune  from  the  broader  forces 
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affecting  the  cities  of  which  they  are  a  part.  Teaching,  research,  and 
other  public  goods  are  also  at  risk. 
This  paper  lays  out  the  case  for  fundamental  change  in  the  way  the 
nation  finances  health  care.  The  first  section,  a  diagnosis  if  you  will,  is  a 
look  at  how  the  tax  exclusion  of  employment-hased  health  insurance 
has  driven  up  health  care  costs  and,  as  a  result,  has  made  it  more  diffi- 
cult  to  get  closer  to  universal  coverage.  The  second  section,  a  prescrip- 
tion,  outlines  the  structure  of  an  income-based,  universal  tax-credit 
system.  The  third  section  considers  the  challenge  of  forging  a  con- 
stituency  for  such  a  plan. 
Dx:  A  Financing Scheme Wrung from the Start 
Employment-hased  health  insurance  was  an  accident  of  history.  It  took 
root  in  the  1930s  when  hospitals,  hard  hit  by  the  Great  Depression, 
formed  Blue  Cross  pIans  to  secure  their  revenues  by  having  people  in 
effect  prepay  their  hospital  hills.  But  it  was  not  until  World  War  II  that 
Blue  Cross  came  broadly  into  the  workplace  and  health  insurance  cov- 
ered  a  large  part  of  the  population.  Employers  found  heahh  insurance- 
which  was  exempt  from  wartime  wage  controls-an  efficient  and 
perfectly  legal  way  of  recruiting  skilled  workers  in  unprecedentedly  tight 
labor  markets. 
Further  impetus  to  an  employment-hased  system  came  in  the  early  1950s 
when  the  IRS  ruled  that  health  insurance  paid  hy  employers  was  not  tax- 
able  to  employees.  The  IRS  judged  that  it  was  hard  to  price  the  benefits 
any  given  employee  received  in  a  group  plan  and  thus  hard  to  estimate  the 
income  on  which  tax  would  be  due.  Moreover,  the  amounts  at  issue  were 
reIatively  small-too  small,  in  any  case,  to  raise  broader  fiscal  issues.  The 
ruling  was  e.vecially  important  as  it  coincided  with  the  development  of 
income  taxation  at  relatively  high  marginal  rates  of  middle-income  groups, 
which  until  the  war  had  been  virtually  exempt.  By  the  early  1960s  some 
75  percent  of  the  workforce  was  protected  by  employment-based  health 
insurance,  as  compared  with  only  10  percent  just  before  the  war. 
The  system  left  out  the  old,  the  unemployed,  and,  more  generAy,  rhe 
poor,  who,  when  they  did  get  mcdica1  care,  relied  on  the  charity  of 
physicians  and  the  cross  subsidies  coming  through  hospital  billing. The  Case  for Retargeting  lhx  Subsidies  to  Health  Care 
Medicare  and  Medicaid  were  designed  to  fill  that  gap,  and  in  the  mid 
1960s  the  nation  was  well  on  its  way  to  fashioning  a  universal  health 
care  system.  The  system,  it  was  thought  at  the  time,  may  have  been  dife 
ferent  in  design  from  the  systems  of  other  industrial  countries,  where 
universal  care  was  findnced  almost  entirely  by  payroll  or  other  taxes,  hut 
it  was  similar  in  function.  The  theory  was  that  an  ever-larger  share  of  the 
workforce  would  he  protected  by  health  insurance  at  the  workplace  and 
that  most  others-important  among  them  the  65eandeover  population, 
which,  unIike  today,  was  disproportionately  poor  in  the  196O.+would 
have  their  medical  care  financed  hy  the  new  public  programs. 
The  Uninsured 
The  vision  of  a  universal  health  care  system  hased  on  employment  and 
on  entitlements  for  those  without  a  joh  faded,  however,  as  costs  surged  in 
the  1970s  and  1980s.  Rapidly  rising  costs  prompted  for-profit  insurance 
companies  to  become  adept  at  shunning  potentially  high-cost  subscribers 
and  at  selecting  “good”  (i.e.,  low)  risks.  Even  Blue  Cross  was  forced  in 
many  states  hy  the  competitive  challenge  of  risk  rating  to  ahandon  the 
principle  of  community  rating  on  which  it  was  founded. 
The  high  cost  of  underwriting,  in  turn,  pushed  premiums  in  the  individe 
ual  and  small-group  insurance  market  to  prohihitive  levels,  prompting 
many  in  that  market  to  drop  coverage,  the  tax  exclusion  notwithstands 
ing  in  the  case  of  small  companies.  Strikingly,  administrative  costs  in  the 
individual  and  smallqoup  insurance  market  today  exceed  40  percent. 
To  he  sure,  the  group-insurance  model  has  heen  maintained  for  large 
companies  (98  percent  of  employers  with  100  or  more  employees  offered 
health  insurance  in  1991,  as  compared  with  only  27  percent  of  employs 
ers  with  fewer  than  10  employees)  (Sullivan,  Miller,  and  Johnson  1992 
as  cited  in  Hall).  But,  through  outsourcing,  even  large  companies  have 
retreated  from  earlier  commitments. 
Rising  medical  costs,  moreover,  caused  state  governments  (which  have 
wide  latitude  in  setting  eligibility  policies  for  Medicaid)  to  keep  down 
the  numher  of  people  who  qualify  for  Medicaid  on  income  grounds  and 
to  restrict  the  services  provided  to  those  who  do  qualify.  Many  states 
have  followed  a  strategy  of  not  raising  the  maximum  income  levels  for 
eligibility  (and  thus  of  reducing  the  redI  income  levels  through  inflad 
tion)-a  key  reason  why  nationwide  only  ahout  50  percent  of  Americans 
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who  fall  below  officially  measured  poverty  levels  are  enrolled  in 
Medicaid.  Even  so,  with  medical  care  costs  rising  rapidly  over  the  years, 
Medicaid  accounted  in  1994  for  17  percent  of  state  and  local  govern. 
ment  budgets,  up  from  10  percent  just  10  years  ago. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  uninsured  population  reflects  these  trends.  It  falls 




The  employed,  who  with  their  dependents  account  for  about  7.5  percent  of 
the  tot&  They  tend  to  earn  low  wages  (the  minimum  wage  or  just 
above  for  many)  and  to  work  for  relatively  small  firms,  particularly  in 
service  industries.  Turnover  is  high  (one  of  the  main  reasons  their 
employers  cite  for  not  offering  health  insurance).  But  the  more  fun- 
damental  problem  is  that  even  bare-bones  insurance--priced  at,  say, 
$2,500  a  year  for  a  family-would  be  as  much  as  one-quarter  of  the 
total  compensation  of  a  worker  whose  wage  is  at  or  just  above  the 
federal  minimum.  With  health  insurance  especkally  costly  in  the 
small-group  market,  the  employer’s  choice  all  too  often  is  to  forgo  it. 
Many  employees  would  also  forgo  it  (and  take  the  equivalent  cash 
income  instead)  if,  in  fact,  they  had  a  choice, 
The  mediculiy  uninsurable,  who  account  for  no  more  than  2  percent  of  the 
toti.  They  cannot  obtain  affordable  insurance  because  of  preexisting 
conditions,  even  as  employees  of  Fortune  500  companies.  Many 
states  have  formed  high-risk  insurance  pools,  which  are  highly  subsi- 
dized.  But  the  appeal  of  the  federal  portability  legislatiin,  which 
addresses  the  problem  supposedly  taken  care  of  by  states’  high-risk 
pools,  testifies  to  the  states’  &lure  to  solve  the  problem. 
The  nonworking  indigent,  who  account  for  the  remainder.  These  are  the 
long-term  jobless  and  the  chronically  ill-many  of  them  deinstinl- 
tionalized  mentally  ill,  substance  abusers,  or  homeless.  They  fit  the 
Medicaid  model-as  it  was  conceived  in  the  mid  1960s  in  any  case- 
but  they  fail  to  fit  into  one  of  the  eligible  categories  (e.g.,  an  AFDC 
recipient)  or  they  have  an  income  above  the  cutoff  level  set  in  many 
(especiaIly  relatively  low-income)  states. 
The  uninsured,  it  is  true,  have  access  to  medical  care,  but  in  most  cases 
only  in  the  late  stages  of  illness  and  in  such  high-cost  settings  as  emer- 
gency  rooms  (Abraham  1993).  Limited  access  is  reflected  in  unusually 
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high  in-hospital  mortality  rates  and  in  the  need  for  hospitalization  for 
illnesses  that,  when  patients  are  insured7  are  often  controlled,  if  not 
cured,  by  means  of  medication  or  other  treatment  prescribed  in  office 
visits.  For  example,  the  uninsured  are  twice  as  likely  as  the  insured  to  be 
treated  in  a  hospital  setting  for  diabetes. 
Americans  have  been  willing  to  tolerate  the  rationing  of  medical  care  by 
price  in  the  belief  that  the  rationing  breaks  down  in  the  event  of  real 
need  (Brown  1990).  All  too  often,  however,  that  is  not  the  case. 
Typically,  the  need  is  recognized  tragically  latefor  example,  when  the 
leg  has  to  be  amputated  or  the  retina  is  ruined  because  of  diabetes,  rather 
than  when  the  disease  might  have  been  easily  controlled.  Indeed,  for 
rationing  by  price  to  endure,  misperceptions  about  what  constitutes  real 
need  must  be  maintained. 
In  a  world  of  managed  care,  even  the  characteristically  too-little  and 
too-late  care  of  the  uninsured  poor  has  been  put  at  risk  as  a  result  of 
the  financial  stress  hospitals  face.  Private  hospitals  succeeded  in  devel- 
oping  profitable  outpatient  treatment  when  Medicare  and  Medicaid 
shifted  in  the  early  1980s  from  retrospective  payments  (which  are 
based  on  actual  costs)  to  prospective  payments  (which  are  keyed  to 
diagnoses  upon  admission).  And  they  were  in  a  position  to  cope  with 
the  revenue  squeeze  brought  on  by  the  new  rules  and  with  the  resulting 
excess  capacity,  as  they  then  had  the  market  power  to  pass  on  unreim- 
bursed  costs  to  private  payers.  Now  with  private  payers  driving  an  even 
harder  bargain  than  Medicare  and  Medicaid,  private  hospitals  are  in 
danger  of  losing  their  role  as  agents  of  redistribution.  Founded  as 
eleemosynary  institutions,  they  are  now  confused  as  to  what  they  are 
and  how  they  are  to  act  (Schramm  1993).  The  comforting,  even  self- 
justifying,  axiom  “no  margin,  no  mission”  is  perilously  close  to  turning 
into  “if  mission,  no  margin.”  Proliferating  mergers  may  well  help  some 
hospitals  defend  themselves  from  the  depression  of  fees,  but  they  are 
unlikely  to  restore  the  redistributive  role  hospitals  played  in  American 
life  in  the  past. 
Public  hospitals,  meanwhile,  are  in  no  position  to  cope  with  the  pend- 
ing  cuts  in  Medicaid  baseline  budgets.  Harder  cases,  but  not  the 
resources  to  treat  them,  have  been  shunted  their  way  by  revenue- 
squeezed  private  hospitals.  What  is  more,  public  support  has  fallen 
because  of  the  resulting  perception  of  inefficiency  and  ineptitude. 
The Jerome Izy  Economics  Instimte of Eurd College  15 Prem-@tion  for  He&  Care  P&y 
Never  well  funded,  county  and  municipal  hospitals  have  become  even 
more  finan&dlly  strapped  as  states  and  localities,  like  employers,  have 
retreated  from  earlier  commitments. 
Moral  Hazard 
The  high  cost  of  American  health  care-and  the  consequent  inability  of 
many  to  afford  heahh  insurance-can  be  viewed  as  the  inevitable  by- 
product  of  the  method  the  nation  stumbled  on  for  financing  it.  Moral 
hazard-the  tendency  for  insurance  to  increase  the  likelihood  that  the 
insured-against  event  will  occur -is  a  threat  to  a  wellfunctioning  insur- 
ance  market  under  the  best  of  circumstances  (Hall  1994).  But  it  is  an 
especially  large  threat  when  premiums  can  be  paid  out  of  pretax  income. 
An  added  problem  with  employment-based  health  insurance  is  that  the 
consumer  is  hard  to  identify.  The  normal  producer-consumer  relation- 
ship  is  muddled  by  the  quasi-consumer  role  of  employers-also  a  natural 
outcome  of  the  tax  exclusion. 
Because  of  the  exclusion,  employees  have  more  health  insurance  (and 
more  income  in  the  form  of  insurance)  than  they  otherwise  would.  The 
insurance,  if  at  all  comprehensive,  buys  two  services.  One  is  protection 
against  the  financial  consequences  of  a  major  unforeseen  illness,  a  rea- 
sonable  use  of  insurance  to  spread  risk.  The  other  is  prepayment  for  rou- 
tine  and  thoroughly  predictable  expenses  that  otherwise  would  have  to 
be  paid  out  of  after-tax  income,  an  unreasonable  use  of  insurance  made 
reasonable  only  hy  the  tax  exclusion.  The  prepayment  is  not  insurance 
in  any  real  sense,  but  a  form  of  tax-free  compensation.  The  exclusion 
justifies  the  costs  of  using  an  insurance  model;  those  costs  would  never 
be  justified  otherwise,  as  they  are  on  top  of  the  thoroughly  predictable 
expenses  that  must  be  borne  in  any  case. 
The  arena  in  which  moral  hazard  hoIds  sway  is  thus  hroad,  extending 
even  to  such  routine  things  as  teeth  cleaning,  treatment  for  head  colds, 
and  the  bandaging  of  scraped  knees-all  high-probability  but  low- 
consequence  events.  Indeed,  the  exclusion  pushed  health  insurance  in 
the  direction  of  increasingly  comprehensive  benefits  and,  then,  as  moral 
hazard  would  have  confidently  predicted,  overuse  of  those  benefits  as  if 
“free.”  This  is  hardly  surprising.  The  effect  of  the  exclusion  on  the 
choice  between  two  insurance  plans,  one  comprehensive  and  the  other 
less  so,  is  to  lower  the  cost  difference  between  the  two  by  the  marginal 
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tax  rate-some  30  percent  to  40  percent  for  most  taxpayers  if  Social 
Security  taxes  are  added  to  income  taxes  in  the  count. 
The  problem  with  insurance  from  a  social  point  of  view,  it  should  be 
acknowledged,  is  its  virtue  from  an  individual  point  of  view.  Insurance 
allows  sick  people  to  make  choices  about  pursuing  treatment  with  little, 
if  any,  regard  for  cost-no  small  gift  at  a  time  of  trouble.  But  insurance, 
especially  if  it  is  excessive  as  a  byproduct  of  tax  subsidies,  reduces  the 
incentive  people  otherwise  would  have  to  seek  out  efficient  providers  of 
care  and  to  monitor  the  care  they  are  given.  Market  forces-which  can- 
not  work  all  that  well  in  health  care  in  any  case-become  weaker  still.2 
The  effect  of  tax-favored  medical  insurance  is  to  spur  new  types  of  treat- 
ment  that  are  better  than  the  ones  they  replace,  but  also  considerably 
more  costly.  As  long  as  the  insured  patient  does  not  confront  outeof- 
pocket  costs,  the  benefit-cost  ratio  of  the  new  treatment  has  to  fall  to 
zero  to  make  that  treatment  uneconomic  from  his  or  her  perspective. 
Strikingly,  the  RAND  Health  Insurance  Experiment,  conducted 
throughout  the  country  in  the  1970s  and  198Os,  concluded  that  a  $1,000 
out-of-pocket  deductible  on  a  family  plan  reduced  expenditures  in  the 
range  of  25  percent  to  30  percent  relative  to  a  plan  without  a  deductible 
(Newhouse  and  The  Insurance  Experiment  Group  1993). 
Moral  hazard  in  employment-based  health  insurance  and  in  Medicare  and 
Medicaid  spurred  costs  all  the  more  in  concert  with  fee-for+service medie 
tine  and  retrospective  payments.  Employers  and  government-at  least 
until  the  198Os-were  largely  passive  in  their  role  as  agents,  ceding  to 
physicians  decision  making  on  the  demand  as  well  as  the  supply  side  of  the 
“market.‘?3  And  so  were  insurance  companies.  Reimbursement  on  the  basis 
of  actual  costs  tended  to  lead  to  many  advances  in  technology  that  would 
yield  some  benefit  but  only  at  high  cost.  And  it  was  an  invitation  to  use 
those  advances  intensively.  R&D  was  influenced  by  expected  utilization, 
and  the  resulting  technologies,  in  turn,  expanded  the  demand  for  insur- 
ance.  “If,  for  example,”  concluded  one  analysis  of  the  interplay  of  health 
care  R&D  and  reimbursement,  “decision  makers  in  the  R&D  sector 
believed  that  the  development  of  a  particular  technology  that  was  costly 
yet  effective  would  cause  government  (and  subsequently  private  payers)  to 
expand  insurance  to  cover  it-as  was  done  with  kidney  dialysis-there 
[was]  .  .  .  an  incentive  to  develop  the  product  even  though  it  was  not  cov- 
ered  under  existing  insurance”  (Weisbrod  1991). 
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Canons  of  Ta  Equity 
Apart  from  its  effect  on  metal  hazard,  the  exclusion  violates  canons  of 
tax  equity.  The  tax  benefits  rise  with  the  employee’s  tax  bracket,  the 
comprehensiveness  of  his  or  her  insurance  plan,  and  the  share  paid  by 
the  employet.  All  three  act  against  the  principle  of  vertical  tax  equity  to 
make  the  subsidy  especially  generous  to  high-income  employees-the 
very  people  fat  whom  insurance  with  high  co-payments  (a  sute  way  to 
limit  moral  hazard)  is  particularly  appropriate.  For  example,  the  exclu- 
sion  provides  employees  in  the  income  range  of  $100,000  to  $200,000 
per  year  an  average  tax  subsidy in  the  neighborhood  of  $2,000,  as  much 
as  the  average  cost  of  health  insurance  for  families  with  $10,000  in 
wages  (Congressional  Budget  Office  1994).  Horizontal  tax  equity,  which 
calls  for  equal  taxation  of  equal  income?  is  also  violated;  100  percent  of 
employet-paid  health  insurance  is  exempt  from  taxation,  whereas  only 
30  percent  is  exempt  if  the  insurance  is  paid  by  a  self-employed  person 
on  his  own  behalf.  (This  inequity  was  recognized  in  the  portability  legis- 
lation,  which  provides  for  a  gradual  rise  in  the  tax  exemption  for  the 
insurance  premiums  of  self-employed  people  to  80  petcent  by  the  yeat 
2006.  This  is  in  line  with  the  tax  treatment  of  employees,  who  although 
they  enjoy  a  100  percent  exclusion  on  the  amount  employers  pay  on 
their  behalf,  typically  pay  some  of  their  own  health  insurance  costs  out- 
of-pocket  with  after-tax  income.  But  vertical  tax  inequity  remains  if  a 
taxpayer  is not  employed.) 
Medical  savings  accounts  are  similarly  flawed,  as  are  so-called  flexcomp 
accounts,  which  permit  employees  to  make  co-payments  and  pay  for 
noncovered  health-related  items,  such  as  prescription  eyeglasses  and  co+ 
metic  surgery,  out  of  before-tax  income.  Both  features  of  the  tax  code 
can  be  counted  on  to  boost  health  care  costs  by  broadening  rhe  arena 
over  which  moral  hazard  holds  sway.  They  both  also  violate  canons  of 
tax  equity  and,  no  different  from  any  other  tax  expenditure,  require  gen- 
eral  tax  rates  to  be  higher  than  they  otherwise  would  be. 
Use  of  the  Nation’s  Resources 
Yet  another  reason  why  American  medical  care  has  become  high-cost 
(relative  to  the  standards  of  the  past  and  to  those  of  other  industrial 
countries)  is  the  nation’s  reliance  on  medicine  to  deal  with  what,  at  bot- 
tom,  ate  broader  problems.  All  too  often,  medicine  rather  than  social 
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pohcy-by  default  rather  than  by  design-has  been  rhe  locus  for  dealing 
with  urban  violence,  teenage  pregnancy,  and  other  symptoms  of  the 
interplay  of  social  disorder  and  poverty.  And,  all  too  often,  medicine  has 
done  a  bad,  as  well  as  a  costly,  job  of  it.  For  example,  the  United  States 
as  a  whole  ranks  highest  among  developed  countries  in  infant  mortahty 
rate  (and  compares  unfavorably  even  with  many  developing  countries). 
Even  so,  in  high-income  states  this  and  other  measures  of  public  health 
standards  compare  favorably  with  the  rest  of  the  industrial  world’s 
(Schwartz  1995). 
The  concern  often  voiced  about  the  cost  of  American  health  care,  by 
business  in  particular,  is  that  the  nation’s  competitiveness  suffers  as  a 
result.  That  is  far  from  the  real  issue,  however.  Because  it  is  in  lieu  of, 
not  in  addition  to,  wages  and  other  benefits  that  otherwise  would  be 
paid,  health  insurance  is  but  one  aspect  of  labor  cost.  In  any  case,  coun- 
tries  with  whom  the  United  States  competes  internationally  typically 
have  significantly  higher  fringe  benefits. 
The  real  issue  is  alternative  uses  of  resources-whether  for  education, 
other  investment,  remedy  for  the  nation’s  social  dysfunction,  or  any 
other  purpose.  A  rise  in  heahh  care  expenditures  faster  than  in  expendi- 
tures  as  a  whole  “crowds  out”  other  expenditures-a  truism,  to  be  sure, 
but  one  rarely  given  enough  emphasis  in  discussion  as  to  why  containing 
health  care  outlays  is  important.  Lower  expenditures  for  health  care 
would  not  help  the  United  States  compete  more  effectively  in  interna- 
tional  trade;  it  would,  however,  make  for  better  use  of  national  resources. 
Cost  contro1,  in  particular,  would  provide  scope  for  dealing  with  the 
problem  of  the  uninsured.  At  the  very  least,  it  would  ease  the  resource 
constraint  that  has  been  at  the  heart  of  the  failure-by  several  of  its  pree 
decessors  as  well  as  by  the  Clinton  administration-to  achieve  universal 
coverage. 
It  is  not  that  the  14  percent  of  the  nation’s  GDP  dedicated  to  health 
care  is  “too  high”  in  some  absolute  sense  (Levit  et  al.  1994).  That  level 
would  be  hard  to  quarrel  with  if  it  were  the  outcome  of  after-tax  spend- 
ing  decisions.  The  country,  instead,  has  hoth  too  little  and  too  much 
health  care-the  natural  outcome  of  spotty  public  programs  for  the  poor 
and  widespread  use  of  tax-free  financing  for  most  of  the  rest  of  the 
population.  Because  of  subsidization  through  the  tax  system,  the  price  of 
The Jerome k  y  Eccmorrrics  Institute of Bard CoIege  19 Prescription  for Health Care  Policy 
health  insurance  (and  thus  of  the  underlying  medical  care)  has  become 
inflated,  causing  it  to  become  unaffordable  for  too  many  people  while  it 
remains  underpriced  for  most  others.  The  institutional  structure  that  has 
priced  so  many  out  of  the  health  insurance  market  has  made  it  difficult, 
if  not  prohibitive,  to  care  for  them  at  public  expense  (Havighurst  1995). 
h  An  Individual  Mandate and a lax  Credit Subsidy to 
Fund Universal  Care 
The  tax-subsidized,  employment-based  health  insurance  that  has  made 
American  medical  care  inordinately  expensive  and,  in  the  process, 
exclusionary  is  now  dated,  Iinked  as  it  is  to  a  model  of  the  labor  market 
that  no  longer  reflects  reality.  Not  only  are  many  low-income  workers 
left  out,  but  those  who  benefit  from  employment-based  health  insurance 
often  find  their  freedom  of  choice  highly  restricted.  Historically,  the  pat- 
tern  has  been  for  employers  to  choose  the  kind  of  medical  plan  their 
employees  themselves  would  have  opted  for-no  surprise  considering 
how  fringe  benefit.  have  been  used  to  attract  and  hold  skilled  employees. 
Now,  as  part  of  a  broader  business  strategy  to  control  health  care  costs, 
many  employees  have  been  compelled  to  join  HMOs. 
A  reasonable  alternative-one  that  holds  out  promise  of  controlling 
costs  as  well  as  providing  protection  to  the  uninsured-is  to  require 
people  to  have  health  insurance  and  to  subsidize  it  as  necessary.  They 
would  obtain  insurance  as  individuals  rather  than  as  employees 
(although,  as  discussed  later,  many  employers  would  continue  to  pro+ 
vide  insurance  to  their  employees  or  otherwise  assist  them  in  buying 
insurance).  The  insurance  would  be  paid  for  out  of  after-tax  income, 
subsidized as  necessary  by  a  tax  credit,  which  could  be  financed  by  end- 
ing  the  exclusion. 
Taxation  of  employment-based  health  insurance  would  not  be  all  that 
new.  For  the  past  several  years  the  imputed  value  of  life  insurance  bene- 
fits  in  excess  of  $50,000,  paid  as  part  of  an  employee’s  overall  compensa- 
tion,  has  been  subject  to  tax.  And  the  original  justification  for  the 
exclusion  (that  the  income  is  hard  to  identify  in  group  health  insurance) 
is  no  longer  valid.  So-called  COBRA  plans  can  be  valued;  indeed,  they 
must  be  valued  in  order  for  the  former  employee  CO  be  billed.  (Named 
after  the  Combined  Omnibus  Budget  Reconciliation  Act  of  1985, 
20  hbfic  Policy Brief COERA  plans  have  made  health  insurance  portable  for  more  than  a 
decade,  although  at  employees’  own  expense  and  only  for  18  months.) 
Also  possible  to  value  are  plans  that  offer  employees  a  chance  to  choose 
among  an  HMO,  a  low-deductible  indemnity  plan,  and  one  with  a  high 
deductible. 
An  individual  mandate  and  replacement  of  the  exclusion  with  a  credit 
scaled  to  income  are  the  key  features  of  a  plan  put  forth  several  years  ago 
by  Mark  Pauly  and  his  associates-a  plan  designed  to  achieve  universal 
coverage  and  at  the  same  time  build  in  incentives  to  contain  costs 
(Pauly,  Danzon,  Feldstein,  and  Hoff  1993).4  According  to  that  plan, 
families  with  income  at  or  near  poverty  level  would  qualie  for  a  credit  of 
100  percent  to  finance  a  basic,  although  comprehensive,  health  plan; 
the  credit  would  be  reduced  progressively  with  income,  reachiig  zero  at, 
say,  four  or  five  time  the  federal  poverty  level. 
A  requirement  that  people  carry  health  insurance  may  seem  burden- 
some.  It  is  no  more  so,  however,  than  the  requirement  that  car  owners 
carry  liability  insurance  because  an  uninsured  driver  represents  an  unfair 
potential  cost  to  everyone  else  on  the  road.  A  mandate  is  needed  to  pre- 
vent  people  from  self-insuring  and  effectively  passing  on  the  cost  of  their 
medical  care,  when  it  become  financially  ruinous  to  them  personally,  to 
society  at  large.  And  it  is  not  all  that  onerous  if  it  is  accompanied,  as 
needed,  by  the  financial  resources  to  pay  for  it.  A  mandate,  moreover,  is 
less  of  a  constraint  on  freedom  than  it  would  have  been  in  an  earlier  age 
when  employees  had  greater  choice  of  medical  insurance  than  they  have 
now  in  an  age  of  the  HMO. 
Fashioning  a  Basic  Plan 
A  health  care  reform  plan  that  would  gear  tax  subsidies  to  need  and,  at 
the  same  time,  be  revenue-neutral  would  have  to  weigh  a  number  of 
trade-offs.  Most  important  considerations  are  the  size  of  the  tax  credit 
that  would  apply  at  the  lowest  income  levels,  the  scope  of  the  medical 
services  to  be  covered  under  a  basic  plan,  and  the  size  of  the  subsidy 
appropriate  at  other  income  levels.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  ending  the 
tax  exclusion  (especially  if  lost  state  tax  proceeds  were  added  in)  would 
yield  revenues  adequate  to  provide  the  needy  uninsured  with  basic,  com- 
prehensive  coverage  and  to  offer  some  subsidization  well  into  the 
middle-income  range. 
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There  would  he  ample  scope  for  both  in  the  $74  billion  of  forgone 
federal  income  and  payroll  taxes  the  exclusion  represented  in  1994 
plus  the  $5  hillion  of  revenue  lost  that  year  to  state  treasuries.  The 
budgetary  resources  to  fund  a  tax  credit  could  also  count  on  the  $11 
hillion  per  year  that  Washington  disburses  to  hospitals  in  “dispropor- 
tionate  share  funds”  to  assist  them  in  the  payment  of  uncompensated 
care  and  on  matching  funds  and  similar  support  from  state 
treasuries.5  With  universal  coverage,  such  assistance  would  no  longer 
he  necessary. 
However  complex  the  trade-offs,  the  principles  of  retargeting  the  suhsi- 
dies  are  straightforward.  As  with  any  redistribution  of  income,  the  politi- 
cal  process  would  have  to  find  a  way  to  balance  the  interests  of  the 
beneficiaries  against  those  of  the  payers  (indeed,  every  public  service  and 
every  benefit  program  must  strike  such  a  balance).  The  credit  would 
have  to  be  high  enough  to  provide  genuine  coverage  (the  diabetes  would 
be  treated  at  onset)  and  yet  not  so  high  as  to  underwrite  the  kind  of 
medical  care  that  most  unsubsidized  consumers  would  forgo  for  them- 
selves,  especially  if  they  had  to  pay  for  it  with  after-tax  dollars. 
Extending  health  insurance  to  all  would  not  mean  providing  all  the 
health  care  that  it  is  technically  possible  to  provide.  But  it  would  mean 
that  all  Americans  would  have  access  to  a  minimum  level  of  adequate, 
basic  care.  No  one  would  be  constrained  from  huying  insurance  that  pro- 
vided  a  deeper  set  of  services,  although  all  such  insurance  would  have  to 
be  paid  for  with  after-tax  dollars. 
One  option  for  the  design  of  the  basic  plan  would  be  to  base  it  on  any 
relatively  low-cost  plan  that  had  already  captured  a  sizable  market  share. 
The  dollar  amount  of  the  full  credit  would  vary  with  subscriber  age,  fam- 
ily  size,  region  of  the  country,  and  perhaps  a  few  other  broad  categories, 
but  only  a  few  in  order  to  push  the  insurance  market  away  from  risk  rat- 
ing.  Another  approach  would  be  to  draw  on  the  experience  of  Oregon, 
Washington,  and  other  states  that  have  given  serious  thought  to  the 
kind  of  services  government  ought  to  make  available  when  state  funds 
are  used  in  paying  medical  bills.  Existing  Medicaid  coverage  could  also 
he  the  basis  for  the  design  of  a  basic  federal  plan. 
The  federal  government’s  role  would  be  to  ensure  that  plans  fknded  by 
the  tax  credit  meet  minimal  standards  of  protection  for  subscribers.  It 
would  also  be  to  channel  high-risk  suhscrihers  to  insurance  pools  and  to 
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subsidize  the  higher  cost  as  necessary.  Significantly,  a  standards  role  for 
the  federal  government  would  preempt  state  laws  mandating  inclusion  of 
specific  medical  services  in  insurance  plans-laws  that  have  been  impor- 
tant  in  raising  health  care  costs  and  that  also  have  worked  to  the  disad- 
vantage  of  employees  of  small  firms.  As  a  practical  matter,  those  firms 
cannot  avoid  state  mandates  (and  also  state  taxes  on  health  insurance) 
by  self+suring  under  ERISA  (Employment  Retirement  Income  Security 
Act),  the  federal  law  that  circumscribes  state  power  in  the  design  of 
employee  benefits. 
Taxpayers  would  qualify  for  a  credit  against  their  income  tax  for  all  or 
part  of  the  cost  of  he&h  insurance  that  either  their  employers  had  paid 
on  their  behalf  or  they  had  paid  directly,  ending  at  a  stroke  the  horizon 
tal  and  the  vertical  inequity  in  the  tax  exclusion.  Nontaxpayers  (most  of 
them  presumably  in  the  lowest  income  brackets)  would  have  designated 
state  or  local  government  agencies  pay  the  credit  directly  to  the  insur- 
ance  carriers. 
The  object  of  the  credit  would  be  to  fund  basic,  comprehensive  health 
care  that  families  could  not  fund  for  themselves  without  risk  of  cata- 
strophic  financial  loss.  This  means  that  no  deductibles  or  other  co- 
payments  would  be  required  at  relatively  low  income  levels;  the  credit  in 
that  case  would  be  adequate  to  cover  the  full  cost  of  the  basic  plan.  As 
income  rises,  the  credit  would  fall  below  the  cost  of  the  plan;  the  insured 
would  pay  the  rest  of  whatever  health  insurance  they  obtain  plus  any 
deductibles  and  other  co-payments  out  of  after-tax  income.  As  income 
rises  further,  the  credit  would  fall  to  zero;  all  of  the  cost  of  health  insur- 
ance  plus  co-payments  would  come  from  after-tax  income. 
The  Congressional  Budget  Office  has  designed  an  illustrative  tax  credit 
that  would  replace  the  1994  tax  exclusion  in  a  revenue-neutral  way. The 
credit  would  equal  100  percent  of  premiums  of  $1,775  for  single  returns, 
$4,425  for  joint  returns,  and  $3,750  for  head-of-household  returns  for 
those  with  income  below  the  threshold  for  filing  income  taxes.  It  would 
be  phased  out  for  incomes  between  one  and  three  times  the  threshold: 
$6,250  to  $18,750  for  single  returns,  $16,150  to  $48,450  for  joint 
returns,  and  $12,950  to  $38,850  for  head-of-household  returns.6  A  fam- 
ily  with  adjusted  gross  income  of,  for  example,  $25,000  in  1994  would 
qualify  for  a  73  percent  credit  on  premiums  up  to  $4,425  (Congressional 
Budget  Office  1994). 
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would  the  required  health  insurance.  All  that  would  be  required  is  that  a 
family  have  enough  insurance  to  meet  unforeseen  medical  bills  without 
stretching  its  financial  resources  unduly-that  it  have  “catastrophic” 
coverage.  Alternatively,  people  at  all  income  levels  (including  those 
well-heeled  enough  to  self-insure)  would  be  required  to  purchase  the 
basic  package.7 
Evidence  of  insurance  coverage  would  have  to  be  supplied  to  the  IRS, 
either  by  taxpayers  (employees  could  use  a  W-4  form)  or  by  the  state  or 
local  agencies  acting  on  behalf  of  nontaxpayers.  Taxpayers  failing  to  pro- 
vide  such  evidence  would  be  enrolled  in  a  fallback  insurance  plan,  to  be 
funded  by  surtaxes  levied  on  those  taxpayers.  The  federal  government 
would  select  fallback  plans  by  competitive  bidding  in  each  geographical 
market  area-a  way  not  only  of  enforcing  universal  coverage,  but  also  of 
goading  the  health  insurance  market  back  to  the  principle  of  community 
rating. 
A  range  of  administrative  issues  would  have  to  be  decided:  what  counts 
as  income  and  what  does  not,  the  nature  of  penalties  to  enforce  the  indi- 
vidual  mandate,  how  to  disburse  credits  during  the  year  to  households 
not  covered  by  health  insurance  at  work  and  unable  to  make  up-front 
premium  payments.  However  complex,  all  of  these  are  issues  with  which 
the  tax  system  has  had  to  wrestle  in  the  past. 
A  WelLFunctioning  Health  Insurance  Matket 
Ending  the  tax  exclusion  and  replacing  it  with,  in  effect?  an  income- 
scaled  voucher  would  alter  the  health  insurance  market  in  a  variety  of 
ways.  In  so  doing,  it  would  have  major  implications  for  health  care  dehv- 
ery.  Without  the  exclusion  to  make  it  reasonable  to  use  insurance  premi- 
ums  to  pay  routine  and  predictable  expenses  and  with  the  tax  credit 
capped  at  the  cost  of  the  basic  plan,  Americans  would  seek  out  less 
expensive  insurance.  The  change  would  push  the  health  insurance  mar- 
ket  toward  catastrophic  coverage,  featuring  high  deductibles  and  other 
co-payments,  thus  economizing  on  the  claims  processing  and  other 
administrative  costs  now  associated  with  the  use  of  insurance  for  the 
payment  of  routine  and  predictable  expenses.  It  thus  would  reduce  moral 
-  hazard  and,  in  turn,  the  pressure  on  costs  ensuing  from  the  illusion  that 
medical  care  is  somehow  free  or,  at  the  very  least,  not  to  be  valued  at  its 
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full  cost.  Individual,  high  copayment  policies  would  offer  a  good  alcer- 
native  to  an  HMO  to  employees  who  now  have  littIe,  if  any?  choice. 
With  such  a  change,  health  insurance  would  come  to  be  viewed  not  as 
an  entitlement  linked  to  a  job,  but  as  real  insurance-protection  against 
chance  but  potentially  devastating  financial  consequences.  It  would  be 
Ulast-dollar”  (catastrophic),  not  “first-dollar”  (ordinary  expense),  cover- 
age.  The  plan,  in  short,  would  go  far  beyond  budgetary  neutrality  to 
promise  real  economies  in  the  use  of  resources. 
The  ad  hoc  subsidies  now  flowing  through  hospital  bills  (which  are  ulti- 
mately  paid  for  by  society  at  large)  would  he  made  explicit  and  transpar- 
ent.  And  there  would  be  better  balance  between  routine  and  emergency 
care.  Just  as  with  any  other  universal  plan,  the  care  given  CO  the  unin- 
sured  who  cannot  afford  to  pay  for  it  would  be  provided  earlier  and  in 
much  less  costly  settings. 
A  requirement  that  all  be  insured  would  remedy  the  problem  of  adverse 
selection,  which  along  with  moral  hazard  is  endemic  to  insurance. 
Because  of  adverse  selection,  low  risks  tend  to  self+insure,  thereby  push- 
ing  up  costs  for  those  left  in  the  insurance  pool;  high  risks  tend  to 
overinsure,  with  similar  effect  on  costs.  With  a  mandate,  however,  each 
insurer  would  “expect  to  get  a  random  slice  of  all  risks,  and  there  is  no 
need  to  charge  a  premium  higher  than  the  average  expected  for  a  given 
risk  class,”  write  Pauly  and  his  associates  in  support  of  their  plan  (Pauly, 
Damon,  Feldstein,  and  Hoff  1993). 
A  mandate  thus  would  push  the  health  insurance  market  in  the  direc- 
tion  of  renewable,  long-term,  contracts-the  essence  of  community  rat- 
ing.  When  insurance  is  voluntary,  such  a  model  is  unstable,  but  it  is  not 
unstable  when  insurance  is  universal.  A  mandate,  of  course,  would  not 
make  health  insurance  affordable  for  the  working  poor  (it  would  have  to 
be  attached  to  a  tax  credit  or  other  subsidies).  But  it  would  undo  the 
breakdown  of  the  individual  and  small-group  insurance  market  that  has 
prevented  others  from  obtaining  affordable  coverage.  Indeed,  universal 
coverage  may  well  be  essential  to  a  wellfunctioning  health  insurance 
market.  Without  it,  risk  rating  drives  out  the  sick,  making  coverage  pro- 
hibitively  expensive  for  them  to  maintain,  thus  defeating  the  whole  pur- 
pose  of  insurance.  And,  without  universal  coverage,  community  rating 
drives  out  the  healthy,  as  it  raise  average  prices. 
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Severing  the  link  between  health  insurance  and  a  job  would  go  far 
beyond  portability  in  breaking  job-lock.  Today’s  financing  of  health  care 
has  produced  a  form  of  insurance  that  is  basically  a  term,  rather  than  a 
renewable,  product.  It  yields  security  only  as  long  as  the  job  lasts.  It  also 
discriminates  against  the  young,  the  unskilled,  and  others  with  relatively 
high  job  turnover.  The  overall  efficiency  of  the  labor  market  would  also 
benefit  if  the  tax  rates  of  the  salaried  and  the  self-employed  were  on  the 
same  footing  (indeed,  if  tax  equity  canons  were  observed  all  around),  if 
the  discrimination  that  keeps  people  out  of  a  job  because  their  potential 
employer’s  health  care  costs  might  soar  were  ended,  and  if  decisions  to 
retire  before  age  65  when  Medicare  becomes  applicable  were  not  so 
affected  by  health  insurance  considerations. 
A  key  question  is  whether  employers  would  continue  to  play  a  major  role 
in  health  insurance  if  they  were  no  longer  able  to  leverage  labor  costs  by 
means  of  the  tax  exclusion.  They  would  have  less  incentive  to  provide 
coverage  or  even  to  act  merely  as  sponsors  of  insurance  plans  (evaluating 
plans  on  behalf  of  their  employees,  collecting  premiums,  and  otherwise 
overseeing  the  functioning  of  the  plans).  Even  so,  some  incentive  would 
remain.  Employers,  especially  those  of  any  size,  are  uniquely  qualified  to 
process  information  about  insurance  contracts  on  behalf  of  their  em- 
ployees.  Group  health  insurance,  moreover,  even  if  paid  out  of  taxable 
income,  is  apt  to  continue  to  bc  significantly  cheaper  than  individual 
insurance.  And  employers  are  naturals  at  pooling  risk  and  thus  at  foster- 
ing  community  rating  in  the  insurance  market-perhaps  the  only  real 
virtue  of  an  employment-based  system.  Employers  and  employees  would 
benefit  on  all  three  counts  from  continued  employer  provision  of  health 
insurance  (just  as  they  both  do  in  the  case  of  taxable  life  insurance)  or, 
failing  that,  from  employer  sponsorship  of  plans. 
Alternatively,  unions,  trade  and  professional  associations,  other  non- 
profit  organizations,  or  government  itself  would  have  to  assume  a  larger 
sponsorship  role.  Or  new  sponsors  would  have  to  emerge:  churches,  civic 
organizations,  and  other  community  groups  that  can  naturally  pool  risk.8 
Such  sponsors  would  have  to  undertake  the  role  corporate  benefits  offi- 
cers  now  play  if  business  were  to  retreat  from  sponsorship  of  health  insur- 
ance  because  of  the  end  of  the  tax  exclusion, 
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Cost  Savings:  Two  wews 
l-low  health  care  expenditures  would  be  affected  hy  replacing  the  tax 
exclusion  with  a  credit  is  hard  to  judge.  Even  so,  the  RAND  experiment 
suggests  that  the  trend  to  higher  co-payments  would  give  rise  to  signifi- 
cant  economies,  albeit  at  the  cost  of  some  forgone  preventive  health 
care  (Newhouse  and  The  Insurance  Experiment  Group  1993).  Those 
savings  could  well  offset  much,  if  not  all,  of  the  additional  cost  of  going 
to  a  universal  system,  especially  since  universality  itself  would  yield 
economies  in  the  early  detection  and  treatment  of  disease.  One  study  of 
the  effect  of  ending  the  exclusion  found  savings  as  high  as  one-third  of 
the  medical  care  spending  that  is  driven  by  employment-based  insurance 
(Phelps  1996).  While  other  such  studies  have  been  less  optimistic,  they 
nevertheless  have  found  savings  in  the  range  of  10  percent  to  20  percent 
for  private  sector  health  care  expenditures  and  about  half  of  that  range 
for  the  system  as  a  whole  (Glied  1994).  The  savings  would  be  even  larger 
if  viewed  in  the  broader  context  of  a  more  efficient  labor  market. 
Increased  oversight  by  consumers  of  the  costs  of  their  medical  care,  oth- 
ers  claim,  would  do  little  to  curb  costs  because  these  are  so  dominated  by 
life-and-death  considerations.  The  judgment  is  that  high  co-payments 
would  have  minimal  effect  since  almost  one-third  of  the  nation’s  health 
care  spending  goes  to  only  1  percent  of  the  population  in  a  given  year; 
almost  three-quarters  of  the  spending  goes  to  only  IO percent. 
These  percentages  underscore  the  extent  to  which  health  care  in  this 
country  devotes-resources  to  the  difficult  cases,  often  at  life’s  end.  And 
they  point  up  the  advances  in  technology  that  have  both  blessed  (on  the 
care  side)  and  cursed  (on  the  cost  side)  American  medicine.  Such 
advances  may  be  the  main  driver  of  U.S  health  care  costs,  but  they  did 
not  develop  in  an  institutional  vacuum.  At  least  in  part,  they  are  the 
product  of  a  highly  subsidized  funding  regime,  with  its  misplaced  incen- 
tives  for  overuse  of  medical  care  not  just  for  cases  all  too  often  beyond 
reasonable  hope,  but  for  a  large  majority  of  the  population  as  well. 
A  better  tax  system  would  change  the  benefit-cost  ratios  for  a  wide  range 
of  medical  interventions.  And  it  would  avoid  the  waste  of  using  insur- 
ance  claims  to  pay  for  routine  care.  But  it  cannot  be  expected  to  offer 
guidance  on  the  volume  of  resources  to  be  dedicated  to  a  grossly 
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kidney.  No  matter  how  sound  the  tax  treatment  of  medical  care  costs, 
such  ethical  questions  (which  go  to  the  community’s  as  well  as  the  indi- 
vidual’s  claim  on  scarce  resources)  will  remain.  Indeed,  those  questions 
will  become  even  harder  to  answer  in  the  future  if,  as  expected,  health 
care  once  again  starts  to  account  for  a  rising  share  of  GDP  Even  taking 
into  account  the  deceleration  in  health  care  spending  in  the  past  several 
years,  he&h  care  is  projected  to  consume  18  percent  of  GDP  by  the  year 
2005  (Burner  and  Waldo  1995).  And  the  ratio  is  almost  certain  to  trend 
higher  thereafter  because  of  the  aging  of  the  postwar  baby  boom.  Even  if 
the  health  care  delivery  system  were  to  stay  as  it  is,  per  capita  health 
care  utilization  is  projected  to  rise  about  25  percent  above  current  levels 
simply  because  of  an  older  population  (Schieber  and  Shoven  1996). 
Alternative  Approaches 
Universality  could  be  achieved  through  a  variety  of  means  other  than  a 
tax  credit.  All  of  them,  however,  are  flawed  in  one  way  or  another.  The 
Clinton  administration’s  proposed  “pay-or-play”  (which  requires  employ- 
ers  to  provide  health  insurance,  that  is,  to  participate,  or  to  pay  into  a 
public  plan)  is  regressive  in  its  implicit  payroll  taxation  of  those  at  the 
bottom  of  the  income  distribution.  Since  health  insurance  is,  in  fact, 
paid  by  employees  and  not  by  employers,  pay-or-play  effectively  compels 
low-wage  employees  to  dedicate  an  inordinately  large  share  of  their 
income  to  health  care.  And  it  perpetuates  the  fiction  that  it  is  the 
employer  and  not  the  employee  who  pays  the  bill. 
Pay-or-play  also  encourages  employers  to  find  ways  to  manipulate  the  sys- 
tern,  for  example,  by  switching  from  full-time  workers  to  partstime  work- 
ers,  who  as  a  practical  matter  would  not  be  covered,  and  by  opting  to 
“pay”  because  of  the  benefits  they  may  glean  from  the  subsidies  to  small 
firms  that  have  been  a  feature  of  the  public  plans  employers  could  choose 
to  pay  into.  Such  an  approach  is  wide  of  the  mark  in  viewing  the  size  of 
firm,  rather  than  the  income  of  the  employee,  as  the  key  problem  of  the 
uninsured.  Pay-or-play,  moreover,  further  institutionalizes  employment- 
based  health  insurance  in  a  labor  market  increasingly  at  odds  with  the 
permanence  needed  to  make  such  a  system  work  well  for  much  of  the 
workforce.  It  would  have  to  be  supplemented  with  cumbersome  programs 
to  extend  health  insumnce  to  nonemployees  and  part-time  workers. 
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All-payer  sysrems  along  the  lines  of  the  Canadian  model  are  said  to  be 
administratively  simple  and  thus  channel  more  of  the  health  care  dollar 
to  actual  patient  care.  Much  of  the  cost  of  public  monopoly  systems  is 
hidden,  however.  Controlling  moral  hazard  shows  up  in  the  cost  of 
claims  administration  in  the  U.S.  system,  but  not  in  its  Canadian  coun- 
terpart  where  it  is  embodied  in  the  cost  of  budgeting. 
Budget  constraints  at  the  level  of  the  local  Canadian  hospital  have  fre- 
quently  spelled  inordinately  long  delays  for  surgical  procedures.  And  hm- 
.its  on  physician  fees  have  meant  several  short  visits  for  patients  with 
illnesses  more  efficiently  treated  at  one  go.  “The  rough  empirical  evi- 
dence,”  writes  Patricia  Danzon  (1993),  “tends  to  confirm  that  overhead 
costs  in  Canada,  adjusted  to  include  some  of  the  most  significant  hidden 
costs,  are  indeed  higher  than  under  private  insurance  in  the  United 
States.  Although  there  may  be  waste  in  U.S.  private  insurance  markets 
at  present,  this  waste  is  attributable  primarily  to  tax  and  regulatory  fac- 
tors  (such  as  the  tax  exclusion)  and  is  not  intrinsic  to  private  health 
insurance.” 
Even  if  the  Canadian  model  had  the  edge  on  overhead,  it  would  be  hard 
to  rephcate  in  the  United  States  (especially  now  that  fee-for-service 
medicine,  which  is  essential  to  the  model,  is  in  decline).  Shifting  to  the 
public  sector  the  8  percent  of  GDP  that  private  health  care  represents 
out  of  the  total  of  14  percent  is  the  biggest  problem  of  all  in  a  country 
wary  of  government-the  key  reason  why  the  Clinton  administration, 
however  much  it  might  have  been  tempted  by  the  Canadian  model, 
apparently  rejected  it  a  priori. 
Medicaid  buy-ins  (which  allow  those  not  quite  poor  enough  to  qualify 
for  Medicaid  to  do  so  by  paying  part  of  the  cost)  would  resurrect 
Medicaid’s  original  design  for  the  inclusion  of  all  low-income  households 
in  medical  care  plans  not  unlike  the  general  population’s.  They  would  be 
scaled  to  income,  which  would  limit  their  budgetary  consequences. 
Those  consequences  nevertheless  would  be  sizable,  given  the  low 
incomes  of  most  of  the  uninsured.  Buy-ins,  moreover,  would  extend  a 
program  that  increasingly  is  identified  with  heavy-handed  regulation, 
red  tape,  and  stigmatizing  of  the  poor.  And  they  would  leave 
employment-based  health  insurance,  with  its  growing  insecurity  for 
much  of  the  workforce,  intact. 
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Integrating  Medicaid  and  Medicare  into  a  T&x-Credit  Plan 
These  considerations  point  to  graf’ting  health  insurance  tax  credits  onto 
Medicaid  rather  than  to  enlarging  Medicaid  itself.  The  advantage  of  this 
approach  is  that  it  would  eliminate  the  disincentive  Medicaid  recipients 
now  have  to  find  a  job  lest  they  lose  their  health  care  (the  so-called 
notch  problem).  The  disincentive  will  have  to  be  addressed  if  there  is  to 
be  a  serious  national  effort  to  move  people  off  welfare  and  into  work.  A 
health  insurance  tax  credit  for  the  working  poor  (they  would  be  the 
main  beneficiaries)  is  functionally  the  same  as  the  earned  income  tax 
credit,  although  it  would  be  earmarked  for  an  expenditure  of  broad  social 
as  well  as  individual  benefit. 
%x  credits  would  not,  it  is  true,  meet  the  health  care  needs  of  many  of 
the  nonworking  indigent-the  deinstitutionalized  mentally  ill  and  other 
“walking  wounded”-who  make  up  almost  a  quarter  of  the  uninsured. 
There  would  remain  a  need  to  develop  walk-in  clinics  and  otherwise 
devote  resources  to  “poverty  medicine”  (Hilfiker  1994).  The  United 
States  would  do  well  to  take  a  lesson  from  Japan,  where  public  health 
facilities  are  widely  used  for  prenatal  care,  immunizations,  and  a  few 
other  critical  interventions.  Poverty  medicine  can  do  only  so  much, 
however.  The  problems  are  far  upstream  of  even  the  best  designed  health 
care  institutions.  If  they  are  to  be  addressed,  they  will  have  to  be 
addressed  through  plans  designed  to  deal  with  poverty  itself,  rather  than 
through  instrumentalities  that  can  do  little  about  them. 
Medicare  also  could  be  brought  into  a  credit  arrangement,  and  it  proba- 
bly  ought  to  be  on  the  principle  that  subsidies  for  health  care  should  be 
based  on  need  for  the  elderly  population  no  less  than  for  the  population 
at  large.  A  heavily  subsidized  health  care  plan  that  is  blind  to  income  for 
all  over  the  age  of  64  may  have  made  sense  in  the  mid  1960s.  Health 
care  was  6  percent  of  GDP;  the  average  income  of  the  elderly  was  signifis 
cantly  below  that  of  the  population  at  large;  and  life  expectancies  were 
lower  than  they  are  today.  But  the  approach  that  may  have  been  reason- 
able  30  years  ago  has  never  been  seriously  reexamined  in  light  of  vastly 
changed  circumstances.  Subsidization  has  become  deeper  over  the  years 
as  beneficiaries  (even  those  at  high  income)  have  come  to  pay  an  even 
smaIler  share  of  overall  Medicare  costs. 
30  PuMc  Policy  Brief WE Case fur  Remrgeting Ta  Subsia?es to  Health  Care 
It  would  be  unreasonable-indeed  unfair-to  cut  back  on  the  tax  s&i* 
dies  to  health  care  attached  to  employment  for  those  at  relatively  high 
income  and  yet  leave  alone  the  subsidies  provided  through  Medicare  for 
a  similarly  well-heeled  population.  Lamentably,  however,  the  Medicare 
debate  has  been  focused  on  fiscal  aggregates  rather  than  on  the  level  of 
subsidy  that  beneficiaries  ought  to  receive.  In  practice,  that  approach 
means  top-down  budgeting  and  continued  squeezing  of  the  incomes  of 
hospitals  and  physicians-at  the  risk  of  loss  of  quality  that  would  harm 
not  only  Medicare  beneficiaries  but  the  population  at  large. 
The  underlying  premise  of  the  debate  has  been  that  cuts  from  baseline 
budgets  should  affect  beneficiaries  evenly  rather  than  be  targeted  to 
groups  less  in  need  of  subsidization  than  others.  Too  little  consideration 
has  been  given,  for  example,  to  linking  premiums  to  ability  to  pay- 
something  that  would  offset  some  of  the  fiscal  squeeze  in  the  offing.  For 
example,  Part  B  premiums,  which  cover  physician  bills,  could  be  raised 
substantially  for  relatively  high-income  beneficiaries  without  even 
reaching  the  50  percent  share  of  the  cost  of  Part  B  those  premiums  were 
supposed  to  finance  when  Medicare  was  first  established. 
Broader  reform  might  well  include  integration  of  Part  A  (which  covers 
hospitalization  expenses  and  is  fully  funded  by  payroll  taxes)  and  Part  B 
(which  today  is  75  percent  funded  by  general  revenue,  25  percent  by  bene- 
ficiary  premiums).  There  is  little,  if  any,  reason  to  distinguish  between 
Parts  A  and  B  or  to  finance  them  from  different  sources.  The  rationale  all 
along  has  been  that  Part  B  is  voluntary.  But,  with  participation  in  Part  B 
effectively  100  percent  because  the  program  is  so  highly  subsidized,  the 
distinction  is  meaningless.  To  the  extent  there  is  a  public  interest  in  sub+ 
dizing  medical  care  for  the  elderly,  that  interest  extends  across  the  whole 
range  of  covered  medical  services  (Aaron  and  Reischauer  1995). 
Integrating  the  two  Medicare  programs  would  provide  an  opportunity  to 
take  a  step  in  the  direction  of  the  principle  of  ability  to  pay,  paralleling 
the  design  of  the  tax  credit.  And  it  would  be  occasion  to  move  to  a 
voucher  or  premiumVsupport  system,  also  paralleling  the  design  of  the 
tax  credit.  The  premiums  of  a  combined  program  could  be  keyed  to  the 
income  of  beneficiaries,  and,  depending  again  on  income  level,  vouchers 
could  be  considered  partly  or  wholly  taxable  income. 
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Integrating  the  public  progams  into  a  tax-credit  plan,  or  at  least  putting 
them  on  a  comparable  footing  based  on  the  principle  of  ability  to  pay, 
would  also  give  the  nation  an  effective  mechanism  for  governing  the 
v&me  of  subsidies  to  health  care.  That,  in  turn,  would  act  as  a  needed 
brake  on  the  share  of  GDP  dedicated  to  health  care  on  the  eve  of  the 
aging  of  the  postwar  baby  boom. 
Building a  Constituency 
Prospects  for  significant  reform  of  American  institutions  are  rarely 
bright,  but  there  are  times  when  real  change  seems  possible,  as  it  did  for 
health  care  in  the  early  days  of  the  Clinton  administration.  It  then 
seemed  possible  to  marshal  widespread  political  support  for  universal 
coverage  if  the  coverage  could  be  linked  to  middle-class  concern  about 
the  growing  insecurity  of  employment-based  health  insurance. 
The  anxieties  and  uncertainties  the  Clinton  plan  itself  gave  rise  to  no 
doubt  contributed  to  its  rejection  in  Congress.  The  plan’s  inclusivc- 
ness-with  its  provision,  for  example,  for  long-term  care,  drug  costs,  and 
early-retiree  insurance-drove  up  potential  costs,  and  there  was  concern 
that  promised  savings  in  health  care  delivery  would  not  materialize  at  all 
early  enough  to  pay  those  costs.  Damage  was  inflicted  by  Harry  and 
Louise,  the  characters  in  a  series  of  advertisements  expressing  the  views 
of  traditional  indemnity  insurers,  who  were  fearful  of  the  plan’s  emphasis 
on  managed  care  and  community  rating.  The  media,  unable  to  make 
sense  out  of  the  inevitably  complex  issues,  failed  to  provide  much  of  a 
foil  to  balance  the  distortions  the  image  makers  succeeded  in  getting 
across. 
Ultimately,  however,  it  was  the  Clinton  administration’s  Republican 
adversaries  who  brought  down  the  plan.  By  labeling  pay-or-play  as 
implicit  taxation,  they  exploited  the  mistrust  of  government.  Only  a  few 
constituencies  were  ready  to  do  battle  for  the  plan  and  fewer  still  had 
ample  resources  and  the  voice  to  do  so. 
Universal  care  advocates  have  made  some  progress  at  state  houses,  but  it 
has  been  slow  going,  for  the  same  fundamental  reasons  the  Clinton  plan 
foundered:  the  practical  political  difficulty  of  raising  the  revenue  to 
cover  the  uninsured  and  the  opposition  of  employers  and  of  small  but 
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powerful  constituencies  with  little  to  gain  and  much  to  lose  from  the 
cost  control  needed  to  make  universal  coverage  work.  Questions  of  who 
pays  and  who  wins  or  loses  have  proved  no  easier  to  answer  at  the  state 
level  than  at  the  federal  level.9 
Health  care  reform  of  any  size  and  scope  is  off  the  policy  agenda  for  now. 
Understandably,  Democrats  are  reluctant  to  embrace  anything  beyond 
such  minor  changes  as  portability.  Republicans  are  also  fearful,  particu- 
larly  of  making  if  Medicare  a  “third  rail”  political  issue  of  the  kind 
Social  Security  retirement  has  become  over  the  years.  They  must,  how- 
ever,  push  for  substantial  reductions  in  Medicare  and  in  Medicaid  base- 
line  budgets  if  their  embrace  of  deficit  reduction  at  large  is  to  be  at  all 
credible. 
All  the  same,  health  care  reform  is  apt  to  resurface  as  a  major  national 
issue  in  the  next  few  years.  The  growing  ranks  of  the  uninsured,  the  cost 
consequences  of  misdirected  subsidies,  the  breakdown  of  the  individual 
and  small-group  insurance  market-  none  of  these  will  have  gone  away. 
The  clash  in  the  workplace  arising  out  of  growing  restriction  on  the  kind 
of  insurance  plan  employees  may  choose  will  still  be  there  as  well.  The 
next  time  round,  replacing  the  tax  exclusion  with  a  tax  credit  may  well 
get  a  serious  hearing.  It  addresses  all  of  these  issues  and  promises  to  help 
control  health  care  costs  through  the  economical  choice  of  an  insurance 
plan. 
Building  a  constituency  for  a  tax-credit  plan  will  not  be  easy.  The  idea 
has  not  been  accepted  among  those  on  the  right,  who  typically  have 
viewed  the  credit  as  a  tax  increase  (not  only  an  increase,  but  one  that 
would  make  the  federal  tax  system  slightly  more  progressive  than  it  is 
now).  Those  on  the  left,  who  often  misconstrue  the  concept  of  entitle- 
ment,  typically  have  been  opposed  on  grounds  that  health  care  benefits 
were  negotiated  in  lieu  of  wages,  and  it  would  be  unfair  to  lessen  the 
value  of  those  benefits  by  making  them  taxable. 
A  constituency  can  be  fashioned,  however.  The  point  to  be  stressed  most 
is  that  individual-based  health  insurance  cuts  the  increasingly  tenuous 
link  between  health  care  and  employment.  It  ties  the  health  care 
security  of  most  middle-income  Americans  to  the  welfare  of  the  unin- 
sured  poor  and  thus  makes  universal  care  not  just  an  act  of  benevolence 
but  one  of  self-interest  as  well.  Moreover,  those  who  would  benefit  from 
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income  groups,  judging  by  the  calculations  of  both  the  CBO  and  Pauly 
and  his  associates.  Even  many  higheincome  people,  who  would  be  net 
losers  looking  narrowly  at  their  tax  returns,  would  benefit  by  seeking 
cost-efficient  health  insurance.  They  would  be  able  to  pocket  100  per- 
cent  of  the  difference  in  price  between  one  plan  and  another,  rather 
than  100  percent  minus  their  marginal  tax  rates.  And,  like  everyone 
else,  they  would  profit  from  the  control  of  health  care  costs  apt  to  come 
about  from  the  purchase  of  cost-efficient  insurance. 
The  benefits  for  relatively  high-income  Americans  would  have  to  be 
seen-and  sold  politically-in  a  broader  context,  however.  They  would 
have  to  be  found  in  the  virtues  of  a  universal  system:  an  end  to  cost 
shifting  (a  hidden  tax  hut  a  tax  all  the  same),  relief  horn  the  squeeze  on 
hospital  revenue  that  threatens  the  quality  of  health  care  for  even  those 
of  unlimited  means,  and  a  clear  conscience  that  people  in  need  really  are 
cared  for.  The  appeal  would  have  to  be  to  the  axiom  of  Adam  Smith 
that  an  individual  genuinely  prospers  only  in  a  prosperous  society. 
Corporate  America  could  well  form  part  of  the  constituency  to  move  to 
individual-based  health  insurance.  It  has  benefited  from  the  leveraging 
of  compensation  costs  made  possible  by  the  exclusion.  But  it  is  not  well 
served  by  the  damage  to  morale  and  to  employee  relations  generally  that 
has  come  about  because  of  the  need  to  control  health  care  costs,  a  need 
rooted  in  the  tax-free  way  the  nation  has  financed  much  of  its  health 
care.  Being  “the  heavy”  when  employees  feel  they  have  been  denied 
needed  care  for  themselves  or  a  member  of  their  family  is  not  a  role 
Corporate  America  could  possibly  want.  Retaining  a  role  in  health 
insurance,  even  if  only  as  sponsor,  would  foster  employee  welfare  and 
end  the  hopelessly  ambivalent  position  corporations  now  find  them- 
selves  in  as  administrators  of  health  insurance. 
Much  the  same  constituency  could  be  formed  around  a  phase-in  of  an 
income-scaled  tax  credit,  funded  by  a  gradual  reduction  of  the  tax  exclu- 
sion  or  a  cap  on  the  exclusion  above  the  estimated  cost  of  the  basic  plan. 
Phase-in  could  start,  for  example,  by  including  all  children-an 
approach  that  would  appeal  both  to  the  right’s  concern  for  “family  val- 
ues”  and  the  left’s  concern  for  care  of  the  poor. 
No  health  reform  is  apt  to  get  very  far,  however,  if  it  is  framed  in  the 
basically  dishonest  pubhc  discourse  of  today.  A  tax  credit  or  any  other 
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